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ABSTRACT
The 2008 Presidential Election brought into office the first African‐American president in U.S. history.
This paper analyzes variations in White support for Barack Obama based on a number of county‐level
contextual factors, which are hypothesized to influence aggregate White voter support for the Democratic
candidate. Based on the well‐known racial threat theory, this paper will explore how racial composition and
income inequality effect White support for Barack Obama. Another key explanatory variable, violence, is
thought to influence White voter support because of the preconceptions some of these voters hold about
African‐Americans. Violence helps shape the stereotypes White voters hold, and these stereotypes are not left
behind when entering the voting booth. If violence helps explain variation in county‐level White support for
Barack Obama, this paper offers preliminary evidence that stereotypes about violence may have a significant
influence on voting and African‐American candidate strategies may not have the sway necessary to overcome
some of these barriers in the electoral arena.
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INTRODUCTION
Race is an inescapable dynamic in American politics. The unique historical context of the United States
with regard to race relationships suggests it is still a salient issue in the minds of voters. Much has been
written on the dynamics of out‐group and in‐group interaction. The relationship between Black and White has
a peculiar manifestation in the United States, though. The development of a multiracial society and tolerance
toward out‐groups has come up short and is still considered a world largely seen in Black and White. Viewing
race as Black and White is not an American phenomenon, yet the way racial perception and the social
construction of race has developed in America has led to a unique dichotomy.
Though the racial dynamic today in not overwhelmingly represented by the overt racial prejudice
which dominated during the pre‐civil rights era, race continues to be a significant force in American politics.
Consequently, White candidates have continued to utilize race‐specific electoral strategies. The subtle
manner with which these appeals are made is still blatantly race‐coded, yet rarely consciously perceived as
such by the mass public. The Southern Strategy championed by Richard Nixon and the Republican Party
brought implicit racial associations into their strategy and helped solidify the certain partisan realignment of
Southern Whites. By emphasizing “law and order” and being “tough on crime,” White candidates have been
able to make subtle racial appeals to White voters and this strategy has and continues to work. These racial
perceptions are certain to also influence how Whites view Black candidates.
The racial threat thesis states that variations in the Black proportion of the population will cause
variations in the attitudes and behavior of Whites because of the perceived threat of racial competition.
Though theorized and measured in many ways, accounts of the racial dynamic of competition lead to threat
hypotheses. Whether through politics, economics, crime and violence, or social control, all these theories
suggest that perceived and real competition between the races produces distinct attitudes and behaviors on
part of the groups in question.
1

Though this relationship can be analyzed at the individual‐level, analyses of that sort are often plagued
with measurement and validity issues, social desirability being one of them. Those with negative racial
sentiments are often not compelled to disclose such attitudes because of the societal pressures against overt
racism. Another, possibly more valid, modeling of racial threat dynamics is to analyze contextual factors and
electoral behavior. Though this does not allow for generalizations about individual‐level White attitudes,
these sorts of analyses can be useful as preliminary examination and suggestive of racial salience as a
contextual influence.
This study emerged from an attempt to demonstrate how violence influenced Southern political
culture (Fowler et al., 2011, Fowler, 2011). But violence does not only influence White Southern attitudes and
behavior with regards to Black candidates, but should sway White non‐Southerners, as well, just to a lesser
extent. The literature continues to show mixed results on how context influences racial attitudes and voting
behavior. Both contact and threat theories can show promise, depending on the context analyzed. So then,
which of these theories holds water when analyzing the election of a Black presidential candidate? The
election of Barack Obama offers a chance to test these theories. If racial voting is influenced by measures of
racial context, then we can assume that Whites may be influenced by their racial attitudes when voting for
Black candidates. By analyzing a candidate such as Barack Obama, who portrayed an aracial identity in his
campaign, we are able to see whether these proxy measures of racial threat still have substance in a campaign
where race supposedly held little salience with White voters.
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PREVIOUS LITERATURE
Media, Campaigns, and Race
Though racial priming certainly influences Whites’ evaluations of Black candidates, cues need not be
given for race to become a salient campaign factor. The existence of a Black candidate is sufficient for this
dynamic to occur. Though, when racial priming does occur this effect is increased. Implicit appeals are often
those used in the present day because of explicit racial appeals violate social norms. Implicit appeals certainly
influence the expression of racial attitudes (Mendelberg, 2001 and Valentino et al., 2002), but Huber and
Lapinski (2006) come up with null results when analyzing whether appeals are actually effective. They claim
that only with certain groups in society, particularly the less educated, does this dynamic become apparent.
Mendelberg (2008), on the other hand, “show that racial cues do in fact racialize opinion” (p.109) and
education may matter, but the better educated are not immune. These appeals can cause voters to access
racial opinions without realizing why or even that they are doing so. They can remain subconscious, but
manifest in behavior.
The infamous Horton ad, though not explicitly mentioning race, is clearly an attempt at racial priming.
This worked extremely well, as Mendelberg (1997) shows that the ad caused priming of racial attitudes, not
crime. Entman and Rojecki (2000) offer an important contribution to the literature on race, crime, and the
media, showing how the images portrayed of Blacks are perceived by whites and how these images are used
in decision processing. The images of Blacks in nearly all facets of popular media are distorted in a way that
causes negative stereotyping of Blacks as a group. Movies, television, music, and news media all contribute to
this dynamic of culture that helps people dodge the information processing necessary to make cues more
complex and representative of reality. These media depictions could be particularly influential in White
homogeneous areas where opportunities for significant contact are few and far between.
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Particularly important are depictions of crime and violence in the news. Local television news across
the country has largely turned to an “info‐tainment” style. This unfortunately has involved relating stories
about crime and violence to Blacks. These news stories also tend to portray the world as a violent place
without showing efforts to control any of this chaos (Entman and Rojecki, 2000). This is not just a violent
world, but news media also tends to portray Black criminals in a remarkably different fashion than White
criminals. This contributes to the degeneration of racial progress and “could reduce apparent and real
responsiveness of White‐dominated society to the needs of poor minorities, especially Blacks” (Entman and
Rojecki, 2000, p.91).
Entman (2006) suggests local news portray Blacks and Whites differently in news stories about crime
and politics and this may encourage hostility, resistance to Black political interests, and denial of racial
discrimination. This dynamic is enhanced by the simultaneous presence of Black journalists and these
portrayals, suggesting that racial discrimination is not an issue. Furthermore, the author states this could be
local news stations, perhaps unconsciously, playing out as a “cultural forum” where television influences
“changing yet preserving racism as a component of American culture” (Entman, 2006, p.226).
These racial attitudes could also be carried into attitudes about the president. Valentino (1999) shows
that racial stereotypes about Blacks and crime influence how people evaluate the president. If these attitudes
were primed when evaluating a White president, the effect is likely to increase when evaluating a Black
president. Though this paper does not have the data necessary to analyze such a relationship as the impact of
media on aggregate electoral behavior, one is assumed to exist. With the popularity of local news media,
whether people watch or not they are exposed to the views espoused through interaction with those that do
watch television news. This means that those who are exposed to television news and stereotypical
depictions of Blacks are likely to influence those they relate with.
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Persistence of Racial Prejudice
Racial context can help explain White racial attitudes, racial threat dynamics, and voting behavior. This
has been suggested for decades and is often credited to V.O. Key (1949)’s racial threat thesis. This hypothesis
suggests that the level of the Black population influences White attitudes and behavior, with more Blacks
facilitating a fear of competition and threat component in the White mind.
Black strangers induce more fear than White strangers in both White and Black respondents (Heald‐
Moore, 1995). This is not surprising given the depictions of Blacks in the media and persistence of racial
discrimination in America. St. John and Heald‐Moore (1996) show that this fear is particularly apparent among
Whites who hold racial prejudice. This racial prejudice is intimately connected to welfare and crime. Peffley
et al. (1997) offer support for the ability of racial conservatives to sway prejudice Whites without explicit racial
appeals, but rather with talk of doing away with welfare and protecting law and order.
Attitudes about crime are constructed using elements of racial stereotypes and are influenced by the
racial environment. Racial composition of a given area, particularly perceived racial composition, influences
fear of crime among Whites. This is often operationalized as fear of criminal victimization. Chiricos et al.
(1997) find that this effect is strong among Whites who perceive themselves to be in the racial minority.
Chiricos et al. (2001) offer similar support, with the inclusion of perceived Hispanic composition, as well. Not
fear of crime, but the perceived level of crime is also influenced by racial composition. Increasing Black, male
populations causes the perceived level of crime to also rise when controlling for objective crime rates (Quillian
and Pager, 2001). These interconnected attitudes about race and crime are influenced by both racial context
and local news viewing. Gilliam et al. (2002) finds some support for contact hypothesis for Whites in
heterogeneous racial contexts. Whites in homogeneous contexts were more likely to be influenced by news
stories utilizing racial stereotypes.
Stein et. al. (2000) looks at how contact theory works at the behavioral and contextual levels. Though
the analysis is on attitudes toward Hispanics, the need to examine both levels is important for better analyses
5

and conclusions about these units of analysis. Perhaps even more important, the authors show that including
an interaction shows that high minority population alone may increase negative affect, but with meaningful
contact these attitudes become more tolerant (Stein et. al., 2000). Dixon and Rosenbaum (2004) analyze
whites’ stereotypes about Blacks and Hispanics pertaining to racial context and find that threat theory does a
better job of explaining negative Black affect than negative Hispanic affect. Going a step further, Oliver and
Wong (2003) examine prejudice in multiracial contexts. They find support for the contact theory, showing
that those that live in proximity to their in‐group are likely to hold stronger prejudices than those in
environments with more out‐group members. Though contact theory may hold substance in the right context
with significant interaction occurring, racial threat or group conflict theory better explains White racial
attitudes. Non‐Black respondents in Glaser (2003)’s study became less accepting of proportional government
allocation as the proportion of the Black population rose.
How are these feelings of competition and threat created? They are a mix of a number of social
psychological elements involving individual perceptions and objective contexts. Bobo and Hutchings (1996)
find support that self‐interest, prejudice, beliefs about social inequality, and Blumer’s group position theory all
contribute to perceptions of racial competition. The group position theory suggests that “feelings of
competition and hostility emerge from historically and collectively developed judgments about the positions in
the social order that in‐group members should rightfully occupy relative to members of an out‐group” (Bobo
and Hutchings, 1996, p.955).
If the racial context is likely to influence attitudes held by Whites about Blacks generally, and about
their actions in public spaces specifically, then the context is also likely to influence the decisions Whites make
in the voting booth. This may be the more likely place to find “true” racial attitudes being espoused because
of the anonymity of the vote, alluding back to the Bradley effect where attempting to ascertain attitudes
toward Black candidates causes a gap between poll data and election returns.
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Southern Whites
The literature on White attitudes continues to show that a Southern uniqueness exists. Southern
Whites are more likely to hold negative affect toward Blacks (Kuklinkski et al., 1997). Southern Whites also
express these attitudes in their vote choice for Black candidates (Liu, 2007), White candidates who run
racialized campaigns (Giles and Buckner, 1993), and even in campaigns where race is not an apparent factor
(Knuckley and Orey, 2000). Continuity of Old South culture can help explain this Southern distinctiveness. The
Southern historical context is defined by race and this dynamic continues to permeate the Southern White
psyche. Contemporary studies consistently show this to be the case (Fowler et al., 2011).
Racial environment is key to conceptualizing the idea of racial threat theory. As the proportion of
Blacks in a county varies, so does White reactions to this change in the racial dynamic. Research continues to
show that racial context has an influence on the attitudes and behaviors of White Southerners. Though Glaser
(1994) finds that partisanship is not influenced by racial context at the individual‐level, but that attitudes
toward racial policies is. Giles and Hertz (1994) offer an analysis that finds racial context and partisanship may
be linked at the county‐level. They show that Louisiana parishes with higher Black percentages tend to have
less white Democrats and more Republicans (Giles and Hertz, 1994).
Southern historians explain the influence of climate and a “culture of honor”, among other factors,
when characterizing the South (Nisbett and Cohen, 1996). Places that are hotter tend to have higher violent
crime (Anderson and Anderson, 1996). The South continues to have high violence, which influences the
behavior of White Southerners (Fowler, 2011) and this can partially be explained as an element of Southern
culture (Fowler et al., 2011).
The election involving David Duke, a White, conservative candidate for Senate in 1990 who was once
part of the Ku Klux Klan, has sparked a conversation among researchers about the relevance of racial threat in
an obviously racially tinged contest. Giles and Buckner (1993) present evidence that Black population does
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influence the White vote for Duke. Voss (1996) attempts to show that this effect holds only for smaller, rural
areas, but more urban areas have more Whites voting for Duke when the Black population is low.
Though racial context in the South may influence the development and expression of attitudes about
Blacks, Glaser and Gilens (1997) find support for the argument that environment matters, and those who
migrate into or out of the South experience a shift in racial prejudice and racial policy attitudes. Despite mixed
results, the South continues to exhibit distinctiveness on race, yet some of these racial dynamics are not
completely restricted to the South. Violence should also influence how non‐Southerners view Blacks and Black
candidates.
Black Candidates
In a country where Black candidates are largely representing majority‐Black areas, can Black candidates
overcome racial barriers to electoral office elsewhere? Swain (2006) offers evidence that Black candidates can
win in majority‐white districts if they run the right campaign and that candidate race matters little for quality
representation. The analysis she brings to bare does not convincingly show this to be the case. If substantive
representation is influenced by descriptive representation, which research shows to be the case (Whitby, 2000
and Tate, 2003), then the goal of Black leadership is normatively appealing. But, candidate strategy is not
enough to overcome the persistence of racial prejudice in the electorate. Reeves (1997) shows that race
permeates elections that involve only tangential mentions of racial issues. Even non‐racial issues facilitate the
development of false perceptions about Black candidate personality and issue positions (Moskowitz and Stroh,
1994). White voters continue to express their racial preferences when voting for Black candidates.
Black candidates take a number of different campaign strategies depending on a number of factors,
but often the electoral context is key. Majority‐white districts will present different challenges than majority‐
Black districts. Blacks are more likely to support Democratic candidates, and often overwhelming support
Black candidates. However, majority‐white districts are not as welcoming. Attempts to appear aracial are
often seen from Black candidates in an attempt to not appear as representing only Black interests. When
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exhibiting behaviors stereotypical of Black candidates, such as the militant style associated with Jesse Jackson,
or appearing to give priority to Black interests, Black candidates risk putting off White voters who fear Black
political agency because of the loss of status quo.
Context heavily influences the election of Black candidates. Just the presence of a Black candidate
inserts race into the campaign. Black candidates with flexible campaign strategies in more liberal districts with
a positive political situation are more likely to succeed than those in other situations (Sonenshein, 1990). The
candidate need not turn away from a liberal ideology, but some issues are deeply connected with racial
feelings. Crime, welfare, and affirmative action all have racial undertones which insert race into a campaign.
Candidate race alone can account for an approximate 10% projected loss in White vote for a Black
candidate (Bullock and Dunn, 1999). This suggests that race certainly matters to White voters, but other
factors can influence this relationship. Lui (2001b, 2003) shows that Black candidate strength is also
important. Incumbency, candidate strategy, and media influence can influence the success of Black
candidates. Incumbency is consistently shown to increase the likelihood of white crossover voting (Stein et al.
2005, Voss and Lublin, 2001, & Bullock, 1984). Deracialization has been found to increase the likelihood of
White crossover voting in urban contexts (Liu and Vanderleeuw, 2001), whereby an aracial campaign strategy
is utilized by the Black candidate. Citrin et al. (1990) shows that importance of candidate strategy in white
crossover voting. Those Black candidates who downplay their race and racial policy preferences are able to
garner more White support than those who appear more “militant”.
Factors which provide information, such as endorsements from the media or time spent under a Black
official, can potentially discount any uncertainty voters have about Black elites. Those employing contextual
analyses often disregard elite strategies and the agency of groups other than Whites, which leaves theories
and conclusions pertaining to threat inadequate (McClerking, 2001). Hajnal (2001) shows that time under
Black leadership tends to ease Whites’ attitudes toward Blacks, but a large Black population tempers this
effect with higher Black populations being related to Whites’ negative views of Blacks and Black leadership
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(Hajnal, 2007). The key point is that Black representation matters, not only for Blacks, but also for decreasing
the continued racial prejudice in the White electorate.
Another influence on how Whites perceive Black candidates is skin color. Historically, skin
pigmentation has been related to social constructions of groups. Those with lighter skin are perceived
differently than those with darker skin, regardless of race. Terkildsen (1993) finds that candidate skin color
has an influence on White voter perceptions, which is tempered by racial prejudice, but dark‐skinned
candidates are evaluated less favorably than light‐skinned candidates.
The election of Barack Obama offers an opportunity for scholars to study how a successful Black
presidential candidate fared with white voters and the stereotypes they hold. He ran a strong campaign
against a weak Republican candidate, John McCain, but did not have the advantage of incumbency. His
relative inexperience, at least in how he was portrayed by the media and perceived by the public, would
contribute to the probability of racial cues being utilized. Barack Obama was also able to run an aracial
campaign. This means his strategy involved persistently distancing himself from notions about how Blacks,
and Black candidates in particular, stereotypically behave. He remained moderate and rarely mentioned race
or prioritized issues in a way that could be perceived as appealing to “Black interests”. If racial threat has an
influence on the election of Barack Obama, then candidate strategy, among other factors, may not have the
power to overcome prejudice within the White electorate.
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
The continued existence of racial prejudice in the electorate leads to the need for more research on
how this prejudice influences electoral choices. Contextual analyses can help shed light on the factors that
cause variation in White support for Black candidates. This study specifically examines the effect of racial
threat theses on support for the Democratic candidate in the 2008 Presidential Election, Barack Obama. Do
White voters take racial context into account when making electoral decisions? Is this relationship based on
political, social, economic evaluations of Blacks as a group? This assumption will be tested not through
individual‐level attitudes, which can be skewed, but rather through contextual analyses.
To suppose that racial context influences behavior, attitudes must also be taken into account. The
literature certainly shows that racial composition influences White racial attitudes. Which context, though?
Any geography from precinct and neighborhood to city and county are utilized to test the influence of racial
context. Liu (2001b) and Baybeck (2006) both take into account the possibility of contextual effects varying
significantly in multiple units. This includes both social and political contexts, which can influence the
existence of threat. Liu (2001b) shows that contact theory may hold water, but Baybeck (2006) finds support
for racial threat when accounting for multiple contexts.
The racial environment within one inhabits not only influences attitudes and arrest rates, but also
interacts with electoral behavior. This seems to be the appropriate way to analyze whether people translate
their racial attitudes into electoral behaviors. This racial voting effect is measured in a number of ways. Liu
(2001a) analyzes White crossover voting for and finds weak support for the contact hypothesis, but this is at
the neighborhood, not county level. The author is able to utilize King (1997)’s EI method to estimate the vote
by race, using this measure of white crossover voting as the dependent variable. Liu (2001b) also shows that
this relationship between Black electoral strength and White crossover voting exists at the election unit, or
precinct, level as a strategic reaction by Whites to protect their interests, rather than react with fear. Liu and
11

Vanderleeuw (2007) present evidence that when it comes to racialized voting, it is “the political competition
between the two racial groups in the electoral arena, rather than social interaction in neighborhoods, that has
a greater effect” (p.114). So, Liu is able to find weak support for contact hypotheses at the smallest social and
electoral units, but what of county‐level analysis? This is the geographic level originally hypothesized by Key
(1949) that should be of interest in threat theories. Also, the two ideas of contact and threat need not be in
opposition. There could be different configurations which support contact theories, and other situations
which manifest various threat theories.
Some have suggested that analyses of racial threat are too simple (McClerking, 2001). To propose that
simply a linear relationship between Black population and threat exists oversimplifies reality. Also, scholars
often include total Black population, ignoring that threat theory speaks of Blacks in the political realm.
McClerking (2001) suggests utilizing voting‐age Blacks, rather than the total population. Remedying the
problem of oversimplification, some scholars have attempted to include multiple measures of threat and
conceptualizations of the theory into their models (Eitle et al., 2002 and Parker et al., 2005).
This study supposes that political context is key, therefore leading to the use of Black citizen voting‐age
population as the first main explanatory variable of threat. This will be measured both as a linear and
curvilinear relationship. So the analysis will test the possibility that the larger the Black population, the more
racialized voting. The other possibility is that the relationship is conditioned where more equitable
distributions of the races lead to more competition, higher threat, and more racialized voting. This should
manifest as a curvilinear, U‐shaped relationship.
Another conceptualization of threat involves economic competition. This racial economic threat is
perceived as between Black and White, and can be measured as such through examining median income at
the county level. Blalock (1967) was one of the first to suggest this path of analysis. This takes into account
the ratio of White to Black median income. Parker et al. (2005) measure economic threat with a similar ratio
between races, but with three other possible indicators of economic competition. The authors use the White
12

to Black ratio of unemployment and educational attainment of a bachelor or high school degree. They find,
using an index of economic disadvantage, that the more economic inequality between the races, the more
Black arrests occur in U.S. cities (Parker et al., 2005). This relationship should also hold for political behavior.
Therefore, the second variable of interest is income inequality between Blacks and Whites at the
county level, which measures economic threat. Places with more racial income inequality are expected to
have less whites voting for Barack Obama because of a perception of economic threat between races. There
could also be a modern day Proto‐Dorian Bond effect, whereby elite agency causes poor Whites in these areas
to vote against the Black candidate because economic conditions are blamed on the Black population.
The conceptualization of threat as fear of Black crime is often the way this theory is tested. Racial
threat is analyzed utilizing social control of Blacks as the dependent variable. Eitle et al. (2002) finds that Black
on White violent crime influences Black arrest rates, but no evidence of a political or economic threat
influencing these arrest rates. The problem is that this approach assumes that political, economic, and fear of
Black crime threats all influence Black arrest rates. This supposes that these effects are translated through
police forces, ignoring the agency of citizens in expressing this threat dynamic. If racial threat exists, this
relationship is likely to influence the mass population and manifest in their behavior, not just that of police
officers.
The third variable of interest is violence. This is expected to influence White voting for a Black
candidate because of the stereotypes these voters hold about Blacks. The literature shows that media
depictions of Blacks have facilitated the development of stereotypes about Blacks as violent. This evaluation is
taken into account when voting for Black candidates. So, places with more violence are expected to have less
Whites voting for Barack Obama.
The literature seems to suggest some variables of interest in this analysis of threat theories in the 2008
Presidential Election. Common controls are also included. Of key importance in contextual analyses of white
crossover voting is urban context. Lui (2003) shows that increasing Black presence in urban areas may show a
13

positive relationship with white crossover voting, contrary to racial threat theory. The rural/urban dichotomy
will be included in the analysis with the expectation that rural areas will be less likely to support Barack
Obama. Age should influence racialized voting because older cohorts are more likely than younger cohorts to
hold negative racial affect. Oliver and Mendelberg (2000) further the conversation by including socio‐
economic status as an important indicator and suggesting that threat theories may need more theorizing.
More importantly, the authors further suggest that real, actual measures of racial competition and threat may
be inadequate. Rather, they attempt to show that this dynamic is also influenced by psychological responses
which assume “the social environment can influence racial attitudes in ways that have little to do with racial
composition or with interracial competition for resources” (p.575). They show that education may matter
more than Black population in determining White racial attitudes creating a low‐status environment where
out‐group hostility is prevalent. Education will be included in the analysis because areas with more highly
educated populations will be less likely to exhibit racialized voting. Income should influence the relationship
because places with higher income levels will be more likely to support the Democratic candidate.
This study attempts to further the approach of including implicitly racial variables by testing a new
measure, violence, seeking whether threat theories are useful for evaluating the election of a Black president.
Also, the Black population variable will be tested as exhibiting a linear relationship and a U‐shaped curvilinear
relationship. The linear relationship generally hypothesized is that as the Black population rises, so does racial
threat. The curvilinear relationship, as suggested by Blalock (1967), attempts to show that threat is greatest
when racial groups are proportionate. Liu (2007) finds support for a U‐shaped relationship, where white
crossover voting occurs more in white dominant contexts. The variations in racial, economic, and political
contexts will be taken into account in this analysis of threat and contact theories pertaining to the election of a
Black president. The explanatory variables lead to three hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: The level of the Black population will have a negative relationship with the White
vote measure. This relationship will also be conditioned by the existence of a curvilinear relationship,
14

where the highest level of racial voting will appear in places where Black and White populations are
relatively even.
Hypothesis 2: The level of economic threat will be negatively related to the White vote
measure.
Hypothesis 3: The level of violence will be negatively related to the White vote measure.
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DATA AND METHODS
The unit of analysis is the county‐level. This variable is small enough to allow for plenty of variation
and small enough to take into account the possibility for interaction, both socially and politically, between
races. The data is analyzed through the use of bivariate Pearson’s correlations and OLS multivariate
regression. Except for the south dummy, all variables are continuous and, where possible, are coded between
0‐1 for ease of interpretation.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics: Total
Sample
Variable

N

Obama White Support Proxy
Violent Crime Rate
South
Rural
Median Age
Median Income
College
Black Citizen Voting‐Age Population
Median Income Difference

Mean
1614
1614
1614
1614
1614
1614
1614
1614
1614

0.33821
328.95
0.52045
0.55355
39.5235
44741.8
0.1294
0.09089
14642.5

Standard Deviation
0.1587614
244.634
0.4997366
0.3138759
4.646272
12372.65
0.0590617
0.1311024
18827.33

Minimum Maximum
0
0
0
0
21.8
19425
0.03458
0
‐143028

0.85996
2333
1
1
55
113313
0.50867
0.81855
75902

Tables 1, 2, and 3 show the descriptive statistics for the full, south, and non‐south samples,
respectively. At the county‐level, the full sample shows a mean of 34% White support for Barack Obama,
while the southern sample shows a mean of 24%. This table also illustrates that the southern sample has a
higher violent crime rate, higher Black citizen voting‐age population, and greater income inequality between
Blacks and Whites than the non‐south sample.
This analysis uses county‐level units from 27 states around the country1. Table 4 shows the white vote
in the states under analysis. A county‐level analysis of this many states allows for enough observations to
make comfortable generalizations about the effect of the explanatory variables on the 2008 Presidential
1

Alabama, California, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey,
New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
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Election. The data clearly show that Whites were more averse to voting for Barack Obama in the South than
elsewhere. The table also shows that the dependent variable has plenty of variation at the state‐level.
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics: South
Variable

N

Obama White Support Proxy
Violent Crime Rate
South
Rural
Median Age
Median Income
College
Black Citizen Voting‐Age Population
Median Income Difference
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics: Non‐
South
Variable
Obama White Support Proxy
Violent Crime Rate
South
Rural
Median Age
Median Income
College
Black Citizen Voting‐Age Population
Median Income Difference

Mean
840
840
840
840
840
840
840
840
840

N

0.24151
356.8
1
0.58872
38.9723
41741
0.11819
0.13925
16912.2

Mean
774
774
774
774
774
774
774
774
774

Standard Deviation
0.13165
253.77
0
0.31721
4.6437
11594.6
0.05589
0.15449
14208.1

Standard Deviation

0.44315
298.726
0
0.51538
40.1218
47998.6
0.14157
0.0384
12179.2

0.11222
230.702
0
0.30588
4.57745
12374
0.06003
0.06826
22558.4

Minimum Maximum
0
0
1
0
21.8
19425
0.03458
0
‐143028

0.84401
1549
1
1
54.6
113313
0.50867
0.81855
75902

Minimum Maximum
0.0778
0
0
0
23.6
24502
0.04552
0
‐123588

0.85996
2333
0
1
55
102500
0.43208
0.67691
68051

The dependent variable is a White vote measure for the Democratic candidate in the 2008 Presidential
Election2. The data needed to construct this variable is obtained from the respective state election websites
and the U.S. Census. The citizen voting‐age Black population and percent vote for Barack Obama at the
county‐level will be used to construct the dependent variable. Though this measure is not perfect, this proxy
for White support is the best available measure of this phenomenon3.
2

One observation for this variable had to be coded from ‐0.002 to 0.
Not all states collect registration by party and even less collect registration based on race and calculating the vote based on race
can be an even more difficult task in smaller locations. Scholars have suggested fixes for this exact problem, as well (King, 1997a,
3
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Table 4. State‐Level White Vote for Barack Obama in 2008 Presidential Election
STATE

PERCENT WHITE VOTE

Alabama
California
Delaware
Florida
Hawaii
Illinois
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Missouri
Nevada
New Jersey
New York
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
Tennessee
Texas
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
Wisconsin
Wyoming

10
53
55
42
70
51
58
56
56
51
42
47
49
52
29
60
48
57
26
34
26
65
39
59
54
33

Note: Data from Times‐Picayune.

This study utilizes data from a variety of sources. First, data was obtained from the U.S. Census for all
variables available in 2008, and supplemented with those that are not by 2000 data. The key explanatory
variable from the Census is the proportion of the Black citizen population 18 years old and over. This variable

Liu, 2007). Gary King (1997) developed a method that attempts to help fix the ecological inference problem. His technique involves
taking the turnout, registered voters, and racial make‐up of the voting‐age population and through a statistical solution can pull out
the estimated vote by race. Liu and Vanderleeuw (2007) show that these estimates do match up quite nicely with actual measures
based on race. Using King’s program, EZi, could potentially provide a more accurate estimate of the white vote (King, 1997b). The
data necessary to construct this variable for the sample under use is not available, so the best available measurement will be
utilized.
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ascertains the electoral strength of the Black population and indicates a politicized racial context. This county‐
level variable is used to determine their relationship with the White vote for Barack Obama in the 2008
Presidential Election. As the Black population rises, the white vote measure should decrease. In addition to a
linear relationship possibly influencing the white vote measure, a nonlinear relationship is also hypothesized
to influence the dependent variable. This is done through the use of a quadratic term for the Black population
variable, where Black population and Black population squared are both included in the model (Liu and
Vanderleeuw, 2007). This measure is expected to also have a positive relationship with the White vote
measure, where racialized voting is higher when there is a more equitable race distribution in the population.
The more complex relationship between racial context and racially motivated behavior can be taken into
account through using this more theoretically parsimonious measure.
Another explanatory variable, economic threat is operationalized using the difference between White
household median income and Black household median income.4 The data is obtained from the U.S. Census.
This measurement takes into account income inequality based on race in a county. The higher the difference
between the two, the lower the white vote measure. Including the degree of income inequality as an
indicator allows for the possibility that the White vote is influenced by how people perceive this income
inequality as economic competition between the races.
The final explanatory variable, violence, was obtained from County Health Rankings. This data is taken
from the 2005, 2006, and 2007 FBI Uniform Crime Reports and combined into a summary measure5. This
variable is coded as the violent crime per 100,000 in the population. Though violent crime by race would be
more theoretically justified, this data is unavailable. This should not cause a problem, though, because it is the
existence of violence itself which matters. Whether between Blacks or Whites, living in a context of general

4

GINI coefficient was also tested as a measure of income inequality, but this measure does not take into account racial differences
in income. Rather, the racial income inequality measure based on median income between White and Black is more parsimonious
with theory and will be utilized. The results are not significantly different.
5
One outlier from Hawaii was dropped due to measurement error. After dropped, the variable became more robust.
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violence should translate into a racial perception because of the stereotypes about Blacks and violence. The
lagged nature of the variable allows for violence in the years leading up to the 2008 election to be taken into
account, rather than violence at the time of the election. This assumes that time is taken from exposure to
violence to occur and time to process the environment one lives in.
The problem of missing data, though small, has to be dealt with in this analysis for the violent crime
rate variable6 and racial income inequality7. Luckily, scholars have come up with a statistical fix using multiple
imputations for this often encountered problem (Rubin, 1987, Allison, 2002, and King et al., 2001). The
approach, EMis, improves upon earlier multiple imputation methods using importance resampling (King et al.,
2001). The program, ICE, will be used to perform these imputations (Royston, 2007).
The remaining variables in the analysis are nearly as important as the explanatory variables in this
model. Urban is controlled for because past research has shown that the racial dynamic in rural areas is much
different than urban ones (Liu, 2003). This variable is taken from the Census and is coded 0 to 1. The
expectation is that the more urban the county, the higher the White vote measure. This is both because rural
areas tend to have more traditional racial norms and because urban areas offer greater opportunity for
interaction between races.
Another key variable is whether the county is in the South or not. The South is shown to be unique
when it comes to race and this analysis expects that Southern counties are more averse to electing a Black
president. For this reason, Southern counties should be negatively related to the White vote measure. This
variable will be coded 1 for Southern counties and 0 otherwise. The South in this analysis is defined as
Alabama, Florida, Oklahoma, South Carolina, North Carolina, Texas, Tennessee and Virginia. The models are
also run for the southern and non‐southern counties separately.

6
7

Six observations were negative after imputation, these were coded 0. The results were not significantly influenced.
After supplementing this variable’s 2005‐2009 data with 2000 data, only a few observations needed imputation.
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Finally, two often‐used control variables associated with socioeconomic context will be included in the
model. The median income in a county will be taken from Census data and coded as the actual median
income in a county. The expectation is that counties with higher median incomes will be more likely to score
high on the White vote measure. In addition to income, education will be included in the analysis. This is
measured as the proportion of the population with a bachelor’s degree or higher. Higher educated
populations are more likely to be at least more tolerant of out‐groups than the less educated. This leads to
the expectation that places with more educated people will be more likely to score higher on the White vote
measure than places with less educated people.

21

RESULTS
The results turned out generally as expected, though some findings were surprising. The sample size
and states included allow for a fair amount of generalization to other states, as well as the regional
comparison. The south variable correlate shows a strong, negative relationship with the White proxy
measure. The overwhelming performance of the south variable, as well as the expectation that a southern
culture significantly influences White support for Barack Obama, leads to breaking down the sample between
south and non‐south to run the regression models. This allows for a comparison between southern and non‐
southern states with regards to racial and contextual influences in the 2008 presidential election.
Table 5. Obama White Support Proxy Pearson Correlation Statistics: Total, South, Non‐South

Black Citizen Voting‐Age Population

Total
‐0.5309***

South
‐0.4945***

Violent Crime Rate

‐0.1179***

‐0.0449^

‐0.0705*

Median Income Difference

‐0.1115***

‐0.1014**

0.0029

Rural

‐0.2609***

‐0.2882***

‐0.1853***

0.0044

‐0.1427***

‐0.0377

Median Income

0.2678***

0.0905**

0.209***

College

0.3807***

0.264***

0.4282***

South

‐0.6347***

Median Age

Non‐South
‐0.2013***

Note: ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, ^p<0.1
Nearly all of the Pearson’s correlation results, displayed in Table 5, panned out as hypothesized. For
the total sample, all variables except the median age variable were as expected and significant. The key Black
citizen voting‐age variable is overwhelmingly significant and negative. The violent crime rate is also negative
and significant, indicating that counties with more violence are likely to have had less White support for
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Barack Obama. This is in line with the idea that race and violence are inextricably linked in the White mind
and may play a role in the political evaluation of Black candidates by White voters.
The racial income inequality variable is also negative and significant suggesting that counties with more
income inequality between Whites and Blacks, measured by the difference in median income between these
groups, are predicted to exhibit less White support for Barack Obama. This lends credence to the idea that the
effects of economic inequality between the Whites and Blacks can manifest in political behavior. The variable
is not significant for the non‐south sample, but has a significant, expected effect for the southern sample. This
finding goes along with the idea that the south has a unique history with regards to race that continues to
permeate racial attitudes and political behavior.
The control variables generally performed as expected. Counties with older populations and more
rural areas are expected to exhibit less White support for Barack Obama. The rural variable exhibits a
negative, moderate relationship and is significant in all samples. The southern sample is of a slightly higher
magnitude, though, suggesting the effect of an agrarian southern history may still hold some water. The
median age variable is only significant for the southern sample and is in the expected direction. Again, this
appears to be an effect from a southern culture where older populations are likely to hold more Old South
views than younger southerners (Fowler, Parent, Petrakis, 2011).
The socioeconomic contextual variables also performed as expected, but have a greater effect in the
non‐south. Both variables exhibit positive, significant relationships with the White support proxy measure in
all three samples. The counties with higher socioeconomic statuses, measured as median income and
educational attainment, tend to have more white support for Barack Obama than counties with lower
socioeconomic characteristics. Now these variables will be included in OLS multivariate regression models to
determine their collective impact on county‐level White voting behavior.
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Multivariate Models
The multivariate OLS regression analysis turned up mixed results8. The analysis is run for a southern
sample (N=840), a non‐southern sample (N=774), and the full sample (N=1614)9. Three models are utilized for
each sample, as well. One model is run on all variables except the Black population variable with the
expectation that this variable will wash out the others. The other two models are run with the Black citizen
voting‐age population variable and then with its corresponding quadratic term10.
Table 6. OLS Multivariate Regression Results Predicting White Support for Barack Obama: Total Sample
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Variable
b
t
b
t
b
t
(β)
(β)
(β)
Violent Crime Rate

‐0.0000884
(‐0.1361583)

‐5.82***

0.0000124
(0.0191067)

0.9

0.0000208
(0.0320553)

1.52

Racial Income Inequality

‐6.52E‐07
(‐0.0773075)

‐3.45***

‐3.53E‐07
(‐0.0418207)

‐1.99*

‐2.95E‐07
(‐0.0349748)

‐1.66*

South

‐0.183962
(‐0.579061)

‐31.89***

Rural

‐0.0716738
(‐0.1417012)

Median Age

‐0.1480018 ‐25.58***
(‐0.4658685)

‐0.1387582 ‐22.23***
(‐0.4367722)

‐4.65***

‐0.0521954
(‐0.1031919)

‐3.74***

‐0.056574
(‐0.1118484)

‐4.05***

‐0.0018966
(‐0.055506)

‐2.21*

‐0.002809
(‐0.0822064)

‐3.61***

‐0.0029504
(‐0.0863468)

‐3.81***

Median Income

‐2.62E‐06
(‐0.2042488)

‐6.78***

‐2.67E‐06
(‐0.208329)

‐7.72***

‐2.39E‐06
(‐0.1864906)

‐6.95***

College

0.9748475
(0.3626584)

13.04***

0.9838169
(0.3659951)

14.06***

0.9665042
(0.3595545)

13.73***

‐0.4543672
(‐0.3752086)

‐19.8***

‐0.7521957
(‐0.6211502)

‐12.7***

Black Population

8

The models were run with various interactions which could have changed the influence of other explanatory variables in the
model. These results did not pan out as expected and are not included in the analysis.
9
The sample was also broken down by region and state, but these analyses are not shown. The breakdown by south and non‐south
is the appropriate way to go about this analysis.
10
VIF tests confirmed that multicollinearity was not an issue. Violation of the homoscedasticity assumption was also a possible
issue, which was remedied by using White’s Robust Standard Errors.
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(table continued)
Black Population2

Constant
N
R2

0.5783097

13.37***

0.5898231

1614
0.5123

15.2***

1614
0.6074

0.5805173
(0.2481824)

6.57***

0.5914233

15.48***

1614
0.6153

Note: ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05
The full sample is analyzed in Models 1, 2, and 3, shown in Table 6. The first model is run without the
Black citizen voting‐age population variables. The results of Model 1 indicate a significant, negative
relationship for the violent crime and racial income inequality measures, as hypothesized. The relative
predictive power of these variables, indicated by the standardized coefficients, is still lower than
socioeconomic and south variables, though. Model 1 would predict that as the violent crime rate or racial
income inequality rises in a county, this lowers the White support for Barack Obama.
This model is incomplete, though. To get a more accurate picture we need to include the Black citizen
voting‐age variables, which is done in Models 2 and 3. The factor differentiating these models is the addition
of a Black variable under the assumption of linearity, while Model 3 adds the squared term of Black population
and takes into account the possibility of a curvilinear relationship. This quadratic Black variable can go beyond
the traditional linear modeling of the influence of a threat or contact dynamic. The curvilinear model can
show that there is not a consistent relationship between Black population and White voting behavior, rather
showing where this influence transitions from a negative into a positive relationship. Model 2 includes this
variable and we find that, as expected, the Black population variable accounts for much of the explained
variation in the White proxy measure. The only variable which has more predictive power is the south
variable. The Black population variable causes the violent crime variable to lose significance, but the racial
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income inequality measure remains significant. As the income inequality between Whites and Blacks rises,
White support for Barack Obama declines. The control variables in the model remain relatively the same.
The R2 for Model 1 is .51, but this jumps to .61 in Model 3, indicating that 61% of the variance in the
dependent variable is explained by the full model. This also speaks to the predictive power of the Black
population variable. Model 3 includes the quadratic term for Black population, taking into account whether a
curvilinear relationship exists between Black population and White support for Barack Obama. The fully
specified model does, indeed, show there to be a nonlinear, U‐shaped relationship. This is indicated by the
negative direction of the Black population variable and the positive direction its squared term variable. This
clearly points to a racial threat dynamic in the 2008 election, whereby as the Black population increases, the
vote for Barack Obama decreases. Once the Black population reaches a point, though, the model predicts that
White support rises.
Rural counties and those with older populations are also predicted to have less support for Barack
Obama. The socioeconomic variable results were mixed. The median income variable was significant, but
displayed a negative relationship with the dependent variable. This indicates that richer counties showed less
White support for Barack Obama. The educational attainment variable, though, performed as expected and
the standardized coefficient indicates that counties with more educated populations were more likely to
support Barack Obama. The south is always pegged as unique and this model is no different. The south
variable is robust, negative, and significant in every model. The predictive power of this variable is only
matched by the Black population variables. The sample size allowed for splitting the model to run analysis on
both southern and non‐southern samples.
Analysis of the southern sample points to a southern culture explanation for the behavior of White
voters. Models 4, 5, and 6 are run with the southern sample, shown in Table 7. All variables reach significance
in Model 4, which also has an R2 of 0.19. The violence, rural, and SES variables carry most of the predictive
power. Model 5 adds the black population variable, which drops the significance from the violence variable
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Table 7. OLS Multivariate Regression Results Predicting White Support for Barack Obama: South Sample
Model 4
Model 5
Model 6
Variable
b
t
b
t
b
(β)
(β)
(β)
Violent Crime Rate

‐0.0001077 ‐5.48***
(‐0.207585)

t

8.43E‐06
(0.0162547)

0.5

0.0000157
(0.0302031)

0.95

Racial Income Inequality

‐1.43E‐06
(‐0.1539552)

‐2.77**

‐6.67E‐07
(‐0.0720093)

‐1.48^

‐6.00E‐07
(‐0.0647038)

‐1.34^

Rural

‐0.1099635 ‐5.39***
(‐0.2649491)

‐0.0688334
(‐0.1658491)

‐3.83***

‐0.0714386
(‐0.1721261)

‐3.94***

Median Age

‐0.0027298
(‐0.0962867)

‐2.22*

‐0.0038603
(‐0.1361619)

‐3.51***

‐0.0039404
(‐0.1389861)

‐3.59***

Median Income

‐2.74E‐06 ‐4.53***
(‐0.2413219)

‐3.13E‐06
(‐0.2758069)

‐5.74***

‐2.72E‐06
(‐0.2396409)

‐5.04***

0.8613922
(0.3657164)

7.77***

0.8271183
(0.3511649)

7.35***

College

0.8694688
(0.3691454)

7.31***

Black Population

‐0.4404702 ‐18.18***
(‐0.5168852)

Black Population2

Constant

0.4867916

N
R2

840
0.1907

7.56***

0.5309967
840
0.401

9.19***

‐0.7094017 ‐10.74***
(‐0.8324724)
0.5100318
(0.3347439)

5.18***

0.5342349

9.37***

840
0.4145

Note: ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, ^p<0.1
and lowers the significance of racial income inequality to the p<0.1 level. The SES, rural, and median
age variables remain highly significant. The full model, Model 6, shows a strong negative relationship between
Black population and the dependent variable, as well as a positive, significant relationship from the Black
population2 term. Though violence is not significant, racial income inequality does remain slightly significant.
As income inequality rises between Whites and Blacks in the south, White support for Barack Obama declines.
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Other key variables in the southern sample are rural and median age, which shows that counties with older,
more rural populations predict less White support for Barack Obama.
Table 8. OLS Multivariate Regression Results Predicting White Support for Barack Obama: Non‐South
Sample
Model 7
Model 8
Model 9
Variable
b
t
b
t
b
(β)
(β)
(β)

t

Violent Crime Rate

‐0.0000593
(‐0.1219977)

‐2.65**

0.0000382
(0.0786106)

1.47

0.0000377
(0.077597)

1.47

Racial Income Inequality

‐3.08E‐07
(‐0.0619228)

‐1.76*

‐2.01E‐07
(‐0.040401)

‐1.17

‐1.64E‐07
(‐0.0329811)

‐0.95

Rural

‐0.0124653
(‐0.0339755)

‐0.56

‐0.0260385
(‐0.0709704)

‐1.27

‐0.0310746
(‐0.0846968)

‐1.51^

Median Age

‐0.0010748
(‐0.0438404)

‐1

‐0.0015723
(‐0.0641313)

‐1.53^

‐0.0017092
(‐0.0697158)

‐1.67*

Median Income

‐2.04E‐06
(‐0.2244508)

‐4.31***

‐1.82E‐06
(‐0.2007659)

‐4.04***

‐1.79E‐06
(‐0.1976382)

‐3.99***

College

1.094867
(0.5856233)

12.26***

1.110737
(0.5941121)

13.23***

1.110394
(0.5939284)

13.26***

‐0.5949291
(‐0.3618688)

‐7.75***

‐0.7983611
(‐0.4856074)

‐6.84***

0.5314446
(0.1332806)

3.02**

0.4747045

11.5***

Black Population

Black Population2

Constant
N
R2

0.456886

10.35***

774
0.2202

0.4636754
774
0.2952

11.2***

774
0.2993

Note: ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, ^p<0.1
Socioeconomic context and Black population are the key factors in predicting White support in the
non‐south. The non‐south sample is tested in Models 7, 8, and 9, shown in Table 8. Model 7 indicates that
violent crime rate and racial income inequality are both significant and negatively related to the dependent
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variable. For everyone one standard deviation change in violent crime, there is a corresponding ‐0.12
standard deviation change in the White support proxy measure, controlling for the other variables in the
model. The socioeconomic characteristics, median income and college education, are the most significant
predictors in the model. For every one unit increase in college education, there is a 1.09 unit increase in the
dependent variable, controlling for the other variables in the model. The median income variable again is not
in the expected direction. Model 8 includes the Black population variable, which takes away the predictive
power of the other variables in the model, expect for median income, college education, and median age
(which is only significant at the p<0.10 level). The fully specified model, Model 9, does not change the results
much from Model 8, showing that Black population and socioeconomic characteristics are robust indicators of
White support outside the south.
When comparing the southern and non‐southern samples, we find that these geographies are quite
distinct in what factors influence electoral outcomes. The non‐south model’s R2 is .29, whereas the southern
model improves on explained variance in the dependent variable with an R2 of 0.41. Though the violence
variable is not significant in the full models, Model 4 shows this variable has nearly twice the magnitude
variable in the southern sample compared to the non‐southern sample (Model 7). In the full models (Models
6 and 9), we see that income inequality based on race is a significant factor in the south, but not in the non‐
south. The coefficient for this variable in the south is more than three times that of the non‐southern analysis.
In addition to the main explanatory variables, the separate samples also show differences with respect
to the controls. Socioeconomic context appears to carry more predictive power outside the south. Education
and median income seem more important outside the south, but much of their predictive power is taken by
the median age and rural variables in the south model. Socioeconomic factors are still important within the
south, but the rural and median age variables also show significance in the south. The continued prevalence
of Old South norms in some counties can account for this effect. These factors continue to be slightly
significant in the non‐south, but the coefficients indicate that these variables have twice the magnitude in the
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southern sample. Finally, the predictive power of the main explanatory variable, Black citizen voting‐age
population, holds much more weight in the southern sample, carrying a standardized coefficient of ‐0.83,
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whereas in the non‐southern sample, college education shows the highest beta.
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Figure 1. The relationship between Black2 and White Support (Model 3)
Figures demonstrating the predictive power of the main explanatory variables can hopefully illustrate
their influence. When predicting the effect of Black population on the Obama White proxy measure, the full
models (3, 6, and 9) are utilized. This allows for the prediction to take on a nonlinear relationship more in line
with a Key black belt hypothesis (Key, 1949). The effect of Black population on the dependent variable should
be most negative when the racial mix of the population is close to equal. The negative relationship for the
Black Citizen Voting‐Age Variable and the positive relationship for the Black population squared variable
suggest a U‐shaped relationship. Figure 1 shows this suggested relationship does, indeed, hold water.
Predicted from Model 3, the prediction line drops between 0 and 60% and then takes on an upward slope. In
counties with little to no Black population the model predicts around 39% White support for Barack Obama,
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whereas in those with around 60% Black population the prediction is around 15% white support. The
prediction line begins to rise, though, showing that counties with about 35% Black population and 90% Black

.1

Predicted Obama White Support Proxy
.2
.3
.4

.5

population exhibit the same prediction of about 20% White support. Figure 2 shows the effect of Black
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Figure 2. The relationship between Black2 and White Support (Models 6 and 9)
population on the dependent variable for the southern and non‐southern samples (Models 6 and 9). Both
prediction lines exhibit the same shape as in Figure 1, but the southern sample sits below the non‐southern
prediction. As the Black population grows, though, the lines converge but never cross. The southern model
predicts 13% White support in counties with both 50% and 90% Black populations.
This suggests that the black threat hypothesis may still have some utility in explaining political
behavior. This does not exclude the usefulness of a modified contact theory, though. Contact may not have
the greatest effect in locales with equitable racial distributions, but rather in places where Blacks make up the
majority. This allows for a greater probability that frequent and significant contact between Blacks and Whites
will occur.
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Figure 3. The relationship between Racial Income Inequality and White Support (Model 3)
Figures 3, 4, and 5 show the relationship between racial income inequality and the White proxy
measure. Model 3, the full sample, fully specified model, predicts that going from low income inequality to
high income inequality there is about a 20 point drop in White support for Barack Obama. Figure 4 breaks this
down by south and non‐south. We see that the red line, the non‐south prediction, is almost straight across,
while the green line indicating south drops more than 10% between the lowest and highest points. To get a
better picture of the effect of this variable in the south, Figure 5 shows the same relationship, but for Model 6.
This indicates almost a 20 point drop from around 40% when the variable is very low to about 22% White
support when income inequality is very high. Though the violence variable did not reach significance for the
full models, Figure 6 shows the relationship between violent crime rate and White support using Model 1.
Both the south and non‐south show little drop in support as violence rises.
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Figure 4. The relationship between Racial Income Inequality and White Support broken down by region
(Models 6 and 9)
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Figure 5. The relationship between Racial Income Inequality and White Support in the South (Models 6)
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CONCLUSION
The American experience is inseparable from racial reality. People encounter race in their everyday
affairs and make subjective evaluations of what this social dynamic means to them. In the United States, this
has largely led to a dichotomous perception of White and Black. The media has a substantial impact on these
perceptions because of the racialized nature of portrayals of Black and White. Theories about in‐group and
out‐group relationships indicate that Whites respond to variations in the proportion of the Black population.
This is often characterized as a relationship between political, social, or economic competition translating into
threat perceptions. This threat, whether real or perceived, can be measured at the county‐level to ascertain
its effect on electoral behavior.
This study analyzes the 2008 Presidential Election with the expectation that race certainly influenced
the White vote in this election. Using measures commonly associated with contextual analyses of racial
threat, and some that are not, this author has found that threat theory still may have some usefulness in
contemporary studies of race and politics. The purpose of the study is to show that racial voting occurs even
in presidential elections and this effect may be derived from influences completely out of the control of the
candidate.
Barack Obama’s campaign fits clearly into a strategy of deracialization, whereby candidates attempt to
distance themselves from being perceived based on racial preconceptions. This still was not enough to
overcome racial factors influencing voting behavior in this election. This paper has shown that Black
population and racial income inequality can influence how white voters respond to a Black candidate,
regardless of a deracialization strategy. This is likely to be true in other cases as well, and further research
should attempt to gauge this relationship for various types of elections.
Various possible manifestations of racial threat are taken into account in this analysis of the election of
a Black presidential candidate. First, a political threat is ascertained by including the Black citizen voting‐age
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population in the models. Second, economic threat is taken into consideration by including the difference in
median income between Whites and Blacks into the models. Third, fear of crime is tested by including actual
violence in a county as another contextual measure of racial threat. Some of these variables exhibited a
negative effect on the White vote measure for Barack Obama, but the dynamics of these relationships is
slightly different for each of the variables. The relationship between political threat and racial voting looks
different than between economic threat and racial voting. As income inequality raises higher, the White vote
measure declines. As the proportion of the Black population rises, though, there is a cut point where the
relationship begins to turn around.
This analysis has found the existence of a racial dynamic influencing the 2008 election, regardless of
region. There is a clear relationship between the Black citizen voting‐age population and county‐level White
support for Barack Obama. Hypothesis 1 is satisfied in all samples tested. Not only does a negative linear
relationship exist, but the hypothesized curvilinear U‐shaped relationship is also shown. Hypothesis 2, that
there is a relationship between economic threat and white support, is only partially supported. The total
sample and the southern sample show a relationship between racial income inequality and county‐level White
support. Hypothesis 3 was not satisfied by the analysis. Though this variable is as expected in the stripped
down models, this relationship does not hold in the fully specified models.
There are several reasons why this variable did not pan out as expected. First, race‐specific violence
seems more parsimonious with theory, but data of this kind at the county level is largely nonexistent. Violent
crime rate is just a proxy measure and does not take into account race‐specific violence. If more accurate,
reliable, and pertinent data were available, this relationship could become a more robust finding. Second, the
measurement of this variable could be causing this null finding. This relationship may show up if the time
frame under analysis were shortened. Maybe there is not a lagged effect of violence and, instead, violence’s
influence on this behavior could be temporal. It could be that violence within closer proximity to the time of
voting may be a more reliable indicator. The local evening news the night before could be the necessary
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variable. Then again, it could be that the violent crime rate is just not the right measurement. Third, a model
that includes individual level variables could shed some light on the situation, but this data is also unavailable.
Knowledge of violence in the community or local television news viewing time could both be important
indicators of this phenomenon. Finally, the answer may lie in the manifestation of race and violence in the
White mind. The disappearance of violence as a significant force in the full model does not necessarily lose
parsimony with the theory that these factors influence political behavior. The overwhelming impact from the
Black citizen voting‐age population variable demonstrates that this variable is what is of key importance, no
matter what manifestation the threat perception takes within an individual. Violence need not exist for
prevalence of the prejudices and behaviors associated with generating stereotypes of this sort. Whether
violent crime is high or not in a county, race‐specific or not, racial prejudice does not require objective
evidence.
In addition to the significance of the variables in the models, the south has again shown distinctiveness
compared to the rest of the country. Southern counties exhibited a lower White support for Barack Obama
and the variables predicting this support tended to be more inflated than in the non‐south sample. Black
population, racial income inequality, age, and rural variables all outperformed their counterparts in the non‐
south sample. This may point to a southern cultural influence on White political behavior with regards to race.
Studies of racial threat are normally conducted on lower‐level elections, but this analysis suggests that
other variables may need inclusion in these models. Mayoral elections, state‐wide elections, and
Congressional election analyses involving racial threat should consider the inclusion of violence as an
explanatory variable, as well as racial income inequality. In addition, scholars can no longer treat the Black
threat effect as a linear phenomenon, but should assume that a nonlinear relationship exists between Black
population and political behavior or attitudes.
Analyzing one presidential election, though a conservative test of this phenomenon, does not allow for
the generalizations necessary to stand on firm ground when making claims about racial threat theories. The
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sample only offers a glimpse at a snapshot in time. To truly determine the possible influence of violence on
racial evaluations, attitudes, and behaviors, more research needs to be done. This analysis does hope to
show, however, that Black presidential contenders may not be safe from racial evaluations, like Black
candidates in lower‐level elections have been shown to face. The American dilemma continues to sway the
populace in ways that punch holes in arguments of a democratic exceptionalism.
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